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•	SUBJECT	Committation Com 2. Tesla Radio	munications and Rada Receivers	» , ១៥ ជ		NO. OF PAGES 3
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- 1. Each airfield had its own communications squadron. The military airfields had military communications personnel and the civilian airfields employed civilian personnel, who served as control tower operators, radio operators, gonicometer operators, serviced the airfield lighting systems (runway lights, approach lights, etc.), and stood guard duty and alert details. The squadron strength varied according to the importance of the airfield and the unit mission. In 1950 at the military airfield at Havlickuv Brod /4936N-1533E/.

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 - 2. Every airfield control tower had radio equipment. Transmitters and receivers such as the German Jalta(sio)FUG-10, and FUG-16 were used. At the start or the end of runways there was static W/T (wireless transmission) of equipment. This DF equipment had loop antennae fixed at 90°. The FUG-16 was used for voice communication with fighter aircraft. The FUG-10 and Halta(sic) were used for voice and W/T communications with aircraft. DF equipment was used as navigation and landing aid (QGH). It was manned on request according to the current type of operations. During non-active periods only a skeleton watch remained on duty with this equipment. The number of operators varied from two to four. All military operators were NCO's. Main power supplied were normally used. Stand-by generators were available for emergencies.

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3.	There was a field telephone link between the control tower and the DF site. At the Havlickuv Brod airfield there was direct contact
	between the DF site and the main switchboard of the airfield. At
	Brno, contact from the main switchboard to the DF site was made
	through the control tower.

A radio network was established between all airfields (with Prague as net control) using secret frequencies and code (voice transmissions). There were also radio links between the various DF sites.

Call signs and codes were changed frequently; frequencies were changed infrequently. There was also

a land line telephone connection between airfields.

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ground radar stations sometimes gave information to aircraft by

formation flights were directed by radar stations. flight (squadron) leader received the information given by the radar station. Other aircraft in the formation did not use W/T but voice contact. This communication had to be kept to a minimum.

6. Not all aircraft in a flight necessarily had the same communication equipment, and some inter-aircraft communication had to be by hand signals. This lack of uniformity of equipment caused confusion in the fly-past led by deneral HANUS on May Day 1951. Only a few of the Messerchmitt aircraft which should have been in the fly-past of the Messeronmitt aircraft. Amazingly, there were no uraculated actually joined the formation. Amazingly, there were no uraculated when, due to lack of communications, a group of Messerohmitts flew through a group of Siebels. Other than hand signals, no interpretation was possible. (This incident took place than was much arguaway from the parade center.) Upon landing, there was much argument among the pilots as to who had been at fault. Approximately 54 of the 150 Messerchmitts scheduled to take part in the display completed the mission successfully. IL-10 formations were ragged Jets flew singly. The official reason are.

display was the existence of a ground haze.

Actually, the visibility was good.

it was the consensus that Jets flew singly. The official reason given for the failure of the

the poor display was due to the lack of good communications.

The FUG-16 was used on Arado and Messerchmitt aircraft. There was a loop antenna on top of these aircraft and some also had a double "clothes-line" antenna from cabin to tail. The FUG-10 was used on Siebel aircraft, with "clothes-line" antenna and a trailing aerial for long distance communication. The Siebel also carried Lorenz aerials

'Clothes-line" aerials were used on TU-2 aircraft

In 1953 the Tesla factory was producing electronic equipment. the same firm produced civilian radio and television receivers, and and transmitters were used by the CSA at Prague-Ruzyne.

a Tesla unit in the office of the chief of crews at Prague-

Ruzyne. It operated as a receiver unit.

listed below some Tesla civilian radio receivers and their

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SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION -3-Blanik 11,000 Crowns **Vltava** 7,000 Crowns Talisman 5,000 Crowns Largo 11,000 Crowns 7,000 Crowns Klasik CSA radio operators bragged that Tesla transmitters and receivers used by the CSA were very good. 50X1 Tesla was working on the development of a VHF set which would use 32 crystals. 50X1 50X1 At Brno-Slatina, teletype installation carrying a name plate marked Lorenz, and presumed it was connected to other civil ₹50X1 airfields. 50X1 As let-down aids, civil airlines in Russia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania used QGH (international "Q" signals) or radio compass. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, QGH, radio compass and Lorenz beam 50X1 were used. 50X1

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